NONo Priors: AI, Machine Learning, Tech, & StartupsOct 9, 2026· 1:09:45

Beam: The Great American Open Model with ReflectionAI Co-Founder and CEO Misha Laskin

ReflectionAI co-founder and CEO Misha Laskin joins Sarah Guo to discuss Beam, the company's 500 billion parameter open-weight reasoning model, arguing open models will capture the majority of global token demand. He details Beam's training on 6,000 GB300s and RL on 10,000 GB300s for four weeks, making it 3-4X more reasoning-efficient than same-capability models, and says enterprises spending $100M-plus a year shift from renting to owning intelligence. He notes open tokens have flipped from 70-30 closed to 70-30 open, calls competition with China's open models healthy, and counters safety critiques citing Linus's Law and a closed model that hacked another company. He also describes AI compressing a multi-year PhD to a week and steady-state research teams of about 100 people.

  1. 0:00Intro
  2. 0:42Building the lab
  3. 3:56The agentic bet
  4. 7:37Scaling & training
  5. 16:51Value & applications
  6. 19:55Reasoning efficiency
  7. 22:36Open economics
  8. 31:31Competition
  9. 34:38Chinese models
  10. 44:44Safety debate
  11. 57:16Science & progress
  12. 1:01:02Research direction

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Transcript

Intro0:00

Misha Laskin0:00

When you remove cyber offensive capabilities, you also remove cyber defensive capabilities. The state of the world today is that we have a few hundred safety researchers within closed labs that understand how these things work, and despite their best intentions, it is impossible to cover the long tail of unintended consequences that these systems might have.

A very powerful closed model went and got hacked into another company, and the only way that company could remediate itself was by using open models to protect itself. That's the empirical evidence of the world that we're in. Linus's Law: with enough eyeballs, all bugs become shallow.

And I have the belief that with enough eyeballs, most security and safety vulnerabilities become shallow as well.

Building the lab0:42

Sarah Guo0:42

Today we're joined by Misha Laskin, the co-founder and CEO of ReflectionAI. Reflection provides open-weight models to power the future of intelligence. Misha Prior was a researcher at Google DeepMind and received his PhD in physics. Welcome to NoPriors. Great to have you here today.

Misha Laskin0:58

Yeah, it's great to be here. Thanks for having me.

Sarah Guo0:59

Could you give us an update on where things are at? I mean, obviously you guys have been pioneering really interesting work in open weights and open-source models, particularly with the U.S. spend. Can you talk a bit about what you've been up to and what you guys have been building?

Misha Laskin1:12

Yeah, so for the last 12 months, we set the mission of the company to build frontier open intelligence and make it widely accessible. And effectively, it's been a sprint to set up a lab that is capable of doing such things.

It kind of feels like maybe there's a Reid Hoffman quote that you're assembling a plane as you're flying it, and that's been the case. We were maybe around 30 people about a year ago, but it does take order of 100 plus, so a couple hundred researchers and engineers to build one of these things like a true rocket ship project.

And we're now at around 300 people and assembled all the teams on pre-training, mid-training, reinforcement learning, scaled up our trained our first models end-to-end, and just released a model called Beam, which is Reflection's first open model.

Sarah Guo2:06

What has been the most challenging part of that? Because when people talk about scale or scaling up models or starting to build these models out, one issue is compute and procuring enough procurement, particularly a training cluster that's cohesive in terms of the ability to use it.

Second is talent, and obviously there's been these huge sort of talent wars in terms of how much people will pay for researchers, etc. Third is sort of scale of data. Which of those has been the most limiting or the most challenging?

Misha Laskin2:36

What's been interesting about this experience is that I got asked these questions at an all-hands at the company. What's been the hardest thing in the last year? And the reality is that everything is extremely hard. Everything has been hard.

Sarah Guo2:51

Startup, yeah.

Misha Laskin2:52

And it's also sometimes people might ask, well, what's the thing that really made your models work better than others or something like this? And again, the answer is everything. You actually have to get 30 thingsright. And that's why everything is hard, because you have to get 30 thingsright.

You have to get the talent. You have to retain the talent. You have to have a strong mission and culture that keeps the talent working together and rowing in the same boat. You have to get the data. You have to get the compute.

You have to build the infrastructure to ensure that the compute is actually usable. And a lot of these things, when you're at an existing big lab, there have been years of build-out that enabled them to have this kind of stable surface.

So I was at DeepMind before this, and a lot of the tools that we just take for granted or I took for granted as a researcher because they just worked, you have to build. So I would say, yeah, everything has been hard, but also very rewarding that you can do it.

The agentic bet3:56

Sarah Guo3:56

Can you talk a little bit? You said about a year ago you guys really committed to do this. Can you talk about the sort of shift in ambition and commitment and what drove that?

Misha Laskin4:05

When we started the company about two and a half years ago, our bet was so maybe I'll contextualize it. Where the world was then, my co-founder Yannis and I had been working on the first series of Gemini models.

We were working on the reinforcement learning team. Yannis was leading it. And we had just shipped the Gemini 1 and then 1.5 model. And that early era, it was similar to the first ChatGPT experience, which was primarily a chat experience.

There was no coding, really, nothing agentic. These models were just good at chat. And

they were primarily 95% of the compute spent was spent on pre-training. So they're primarily pre-trained models. We are reinforcement learning researchers. That's been our lineage. Yannis, my co-founder, was one of the founding engineers at DeepMind and was a key contributor to all the big RL projects that came out of that lab, including AlphaGo.

And our bet was because we were working on the RL team, and we saw that RL for aligning chat models works. There's only so much you can align them. Well, now there's a lot more. Now they're agents. But at the time, they were just chat.

So RL was working, and we just thought that, well, if you take that and apply it to domains where mathematics, coding, that you could make these systems agentic. That was the big bet. And we thought that you could do this as an independent lab much more capital-efficiently because we started seeing open-source, open models materialize.

There was a small model from Mistral at the time. LLaMA 2 had just released, and we saw LLaMA 3 coming.

Sarah Guo5:54

This feels like ages ago.

Misha Laskin5:55

Yeah. Yeah, this was a while back, I guess two years ago. And we thought that there would be a great open model base that someone would build that we could build on and do our research and scale reinforcement learning.

And over that first year of the company, what ended up happening was that, one, reinforcement learning started working faster than we thought it would, both within our experiments, but also within industry 01 came out at that time. We actually thought it would take longer just because the journey from ImageNet in 2012 to RL systems that worked at scale was about four years.

So we thought maybe something similar, but every year moves faster than my prediction the previous year. And so about a year into the company, we got to the point where they're actually all the good open models are coming from China.

There were not really good Western open models. And we needed one as a base for kind of the technology that we were building and decided for a number of reasons that the most impactful thing we could do, given the state of play, was to just build open models ourselves end-to-end and combine the RL bet together.

We're just building models end-to-end. I guess there were enterprise reasons. There were geopolitical reasons happening, but also there was the research reason that it turned out you actually do need to pre-train your model in order to make reinforcement learning work very well at scale.

So you actually kind of do need to do the things are just so tightly coupled that you do need to do both.

Scaling & training7:37

Sarah Guo7:37

The conventional wisdom has been that pre-training at the scale of the frontier is impossibly expensive, or at least extraordinarily so. Clearly, there's been a huge shift of compute toward post-training. Feel free not to answer this, and we can just cut it.

But how did you think about just the resources needed or the ratio, or did you have design principles around the model that made this feel tenable to you at the beginning? Or did you just say, "We need to do this.

We'll go resource it"?

Misha Laskin8:07

Well, the nice thing about being an open model lab is that you can also talk about things openly. So you do need a lot of resources to build something meaningful. You don't need the same amount of resources. Once you get to the frontier and you're really, really at the frontier of intelligence, then you need the same amount of resources as any other frontier lab because you can kind of think about research as exploration of new ideas versus execution of known ideas.

Part of why getting great talent in matters a lot is because you get to cut down on exploration and focus on execution of the things that work. So all this is to say is that if you are catching up to the frontier, you can do it a lot more capital-efficiently.

Sarah Guo8:55

How much capital do you think it would take to catch up to the frontier?

Misha Laskin8:58

Well, I think that it depends that the frontier keeps moving. So each year, it's actually more capital. And I'll get back to the question on the resourcing between, let's say, pre-training and post-training. I would say that a year ago, or maybe 18 months ago, it would have been and I say orders, meaning that order of 100 million, so hundreds of millions of dollars.

I think that now, or let's say even six months ago, it was probably order billion, so billions of dollars, single-digit billions. Going into next year, I think order 10. You can kind of think about it as for every generation of model, there's a 4X multiplier in compute, roughly.

And one heuristic that I have is when

let's say we talk about the chips that are currently considered the ones that a frontier chip, and maybe a couple of years ago, was an H100, and maybe it was 100,000 H100s. Then Astra was trained, and that was just a big run on 100,000 blackwells, which is roughly a 4X multiplier on an H100.

Now the next generation is going to be around 100,000 Vera Rubins, I believe. So that kind of gives you the scale, and it moves from hundreds of millions to billions to tens of billions.

Sarah Guo10:10

Yeah. It seems like at some point that has to asymptothe then because ultimately, relative to revenue scale of these companies, even potential revenue scale, you start to tap out in terms of the ability to invest against what you're actually going to produce from an economic value perspective.

Misha Laskin10:23

Absolutely.

Sarah Guo10:24

So do you think we're heading into that asymptote in terms of model size or at least training cluster size?

Misha Laskin10:29

Absolutely. I think that in terms of there's only so much CapEx that you can do. And frontier labs are now putting hundreds of billions of dollars into it. So will they be putting trillions of dollars in the next year or two?

It's probably unlikely, but there are a couple of things that are happening. One is that the use of that compute is becoming a lot more efficient because the models are themselves becoming tools that help build themselves. So I think that when it was just human researchers doing the work, there's probably a 7X improvement each year.

And you can actually track these things very technically. And in pre-training, you do it by you have your pre-training loss, and then you measure your compute efficiency gains against you made some changes. Now you have a new pre-training loss, and it should be that you got to the same point with less compute.

And so when you say 7X, it's actually a very concrete thing that you're studying. And now I would say across the systems of I mean, pre-training is probably a bit more hardened, but there's a lot of headroom in reinforcement learning.

We're probably at a point where it's 30X efficiency, depending how good your model is for actually improving itself. So that is one thing that's happening.

Sarah Guo11:49

30X per year or over what?

Misha Laskin11:51

Yeah, something like that. Yeah. I mean, it depends on what metric it is, but roughly, I do think that the speed is probably four or more times faster than researchers just doing it alone, and that'll probably accelerate. So the amount of intelligence you can extract per training flop is increasing.

So at some point, that asymptote is OK. And then also, the amount of revenue that each flop can generate also increases the more you pack intelligence. So going back to the question around how does this distribute across pre-training and reinforcement learning and.

To train Beam, which is a 500 billion parameter model, total 23B active, it was 6,000 GB300s. We ran it, I think, for a few weeks, but now, with infrastructure efficiencies, we can do it in about 12 days, maybe less.

So it's a coupling of scientific and infrastructure efficiencies. Reinforcement learning was a little over 10,000 GB300s for four weeks. So actually, there were more flops spent on reinforcement learning. Reinforcement learning jobs are more complex in the sense that you do both a lot of inference at scale with all sorts of sandboxes for agents and training.

The reason I got into AI was I saw my co-founder's work on AlphaGo, and I was a physicist at the time. And there was a moment there was a plot in AlphaGo where it just never stopped improving. It just kept improving.

And they just cut it off at some point because what's the point of improving it further? You already beat the world champion. And I thought that, well, if you start to figure out how to apply that recipe to stuff that is economically valuable, then, well, at that point, it becomes an economic question of how much money do I want to put in to just keep improving the system.

And we as a field are there. And one of the, I think, things that I'm really excited about in this open-source project and the tech report that we'll have in it is that we'll describe how these things are built.

And indeed, this reinforcement learning system never stopped learning. If you look at our plots, they just keep going up. And it's just a matter of compute, basically, in terms of scaling it further. So that is to say, we as a field are there where you have these RL systems that are very general that don't really stop improving.

You want to make them a lot more efficient to extract the most intelligence from your compute. But that means that you move from a question of can you train these things to where can you get the data and what is economically valuable.

And it's just an economics decision of how much money do I put into X to get some kind of improvement out of it, which is incredible.

This was not true two years ago.

Sarah Guo14:40

What can you share about where you've already decided we should turn the crank in terms of just continuing to invest in capability?

Misha Laskin14:46

This is almost to some kind of dissatisfaction to some scientists and that it's moved I mean, it is a science, but I would say feels more of an engineering discipline. It seems more like, again, the rocket trip analogy and the way that building rockets is a science, but most people think about it as an engineering discipline with some scientific work in it.

And that's roughly how it feels. So

the stages are kind of set in that the axes of scaling are today. And now there might be something kind of totally blue ocean that we don't know, and there's some neolabs exploring it. But it's pre-training, synthetic data, reinforcement learning.

Or in some sense, you can say just training and reinforcement learning. And there are architectural improvements that can be made. There are data improvements, algorithmic improvements. But it doesn't feel like a Wild West the way I felt five years ago or something.

Something that was kind of beautiful about both DeepMind and Google Brain, and even if you look at early OpenAI is how diverse the bets were. And people were doing just crazy, fun stuff. And now it's really narrowed in.

And part of it, there's also a bit of a hardware lottery kind of thing because once something starts working, the hardware also starts co-optimizing against it. And so it's harder to find even if you have a great new idea, if it's not really a good fit for the hardware, it doesn't make sense.

So to answer your question,

there hasn't been an asymptote of how much juice you can get out of better pre-training. We're not seeing a slowdown in compute efficiency gains. You keep seeing stuff. There's a lot of headroom in reinforcement learning. I think that that one is probably

there's a lot of stuff to be kind of discovered there. But again, it feels more like an engineering discovery than groundbreaking understanding of a new science or something like this.

Value & applications16:51

Sarah Guo16:52

And then you mentioned investing against some economic activity or some productivity out of this that then allows you to sort of keep going from a capital, et cetera, perspective. I know, for example, Anthropic placed a pretty early bet on code.

OpenAI kind of did that too. They originally had a coding model that they're working with GitHub Copilot on. And then they obviously diversified into consumer and other areas. Are there specific application areas that you all are most focused on from the perspective of economic value creation?

Is it code and agentic workflows? Is it something else? Because that seems to be the basis for a lot. I'm just sort of curious if there's a hypothesis on where your model will be used the most or where you need to direct it most.

Misha Laskin17:31

Yeah. I think the code and agentic stuff kind of sets a foundation for the intelligence. And the intelligence is ultimately it's interesting. It's jagged in the sense that, one, it's generalized in a surprising way.

I was surprised by how quickly our model got to a level of capability that is fairly fresh and recent that other labs were discovering not so long ago. And so there is some kind of stitching like generalization happening.

At the same time, it is somewhat jagged where it quickly adapts to data once you have theright data for tasks you want to do. But there is kind of a jaggedness about it. And it's even between the various benchmarks, like the various versions of terminal bench.

You don't see clean generalization between different harnesses. But once you have something working, you have a general agentic capability, and you get the data for a new harness, it actually starts adapting to it pretty quickly. So what that means is that you have this pretty adaptive thing that you need to and then it's a matter of where are the economically valuable pools of data.

That's, I mean, part of what makes open models, I think, powerful is that, well, enterprises and customers can take it and customize it for their own stuff and get something that is kind of pareto optimal for their workloads, like the lowest cost for the highest performance.

And so it's an empirical question. You go to kind of customers, you actually see what is valuable to them, and you see whether it's possible to and usually, when it's economically valuable, you can generate data because it's not even that you're going to be training on the customer's data.

It's more that you're setting up evaluations. And if you can set up a good evaluation for their tasks, then you can generate synthetic data that are approximated, and you get good generalization. And so concretely, finance, various know-your-customer flows and compliance flows in finance are very valuable.

A lot of things, different things in cybersecurity, cyber defense in particular, are quite valuable. Legal, there are all sorts of kind of agentic verticals within enterprise that are valuable and have a pretty similar pattern in terms of how you get something working there.

Reasoning efficiency19:55

Sarah Guo19:55

One thing that stands out on Beam is the reasoning efficiency of the model. Could you tell us a little bit more about that?

Misha Laskin20:00

So Beam is a model that was trained for coding and agentic tasks. That's where it excels. And an important thing in model building is not just the capability, but how quickly an agent achieves a thing. So it translates to faster workload times, cheaper costs for customers.

If you've ever sat around

your favorite AI chat and asked it something and it took it 10 minutes, much better if it does it in one. So Beam tends to be three to four times more efficient than models of the same capability class and much more efficient when it comes to there are models that are larger out there

where the efficiency gains then end up being something like 10X. And the reason it's so efficient is because we prioritized, well, both a strong pre-training base for reasoning, but then amplified it with reinforcement learning at what we believe to be the largest scale that's ever been done in open source.

I've not seen a 10,000 GB300 for four weeks run documented yet. And reinforcement learning, the way you tend to set it up is that you want to extract the maximum amount of capability in the least amount of time.

And this is the same thing that happened in the previous systems like AlphaGo. The first AlphaGo agents were pretty meandering in the way that they were solving the problem. And then by the time you got it to lease it all level, it was just very smart in its search.

So that's really what enabled it to have that capability. So the more reinforcement learning you run, the higher the capability and the faster these systems solve it.

Sarah Guo21:50

Awesome. That seems very pragmatic.

Misha Laskin21:52

The intention, I guess, because we are kind of RL believers, and so we always believe that that was the pathway GI was through reinforcement learning with actually a really strong base. We forget that the first AlphaGo systems had they were trained on expert amateur human games.

So they did this imitation learning first and then reinforcement learning. So you kind of need those things working together. And a byproduct of it is that you get this really economically kind of valuable thing that it's very reasoning efficient and makes a really nice workhorse model for enterprises and public sector sovereign.

Open economics22:36

Sarah Guo22:36

And from a monetization perspective, there's different ways to commercialize both open source and open weight models. And Mistral and others were early in terms of different approaches to doing so. Is there a specific direction that you all have been heading in that you can share?

Misha Laskin22:51

Yeah. I think that commercialization of, let's say, open and closed models is, in some sense, pretty similar. What you're really trying to do is you're trying to maximize inference. That's really what you're trying to do. And the difference is that

it's basically like rental versus ownership inference. So an example is that when you're buying a token, you're renting a piece of a whole stack, which is the harness. If there's an agentic harness in there, the model, the inference software, the cluster management software, the GPUs that it's running on, and all of that is sort of amortized into a token, and you're renting a piece of that whole thing.

When you want to own your intelligence for a number of reasons, and I liken it to we start typically off renting our apartments. But then as you grow up, you want to own a house for various reasons, even if it's a bit of a headache.

I mean, it can be. But as you get to a point where you're financially mature enough and you have a family and so forth, you want to own it. And AI has matured

in a commercial market to the point where enterprises are spending a lot of money on renting their intelligence and then want to start owning it for various reasons around control. And so going back to monetization, what's the difference between a closed and open model?

Well, the open model is permissive. But

in order for a customer to make use of it, they need all the other stuff that went around it. The stuff that you kind of take for granted from a closed model, you need the cluster management software. You need the inference software.

You need the harness and so forth. And so we provide to large enterprises, sovereigns, all the tools that they need to make kind of open model deployment successful. And even when we think about services, because a lot of enterprises, most enterprises need some handholding on this, we think about services as how do we go in, unlock really valuable use cases that drive a lot of compute demand, inference demand.

And in a sense, services and open model is like a demand driver for an inference business.

Sarah Guo25:05

What do you think I won't ask you to project too far because it's just very hard, but over a one or two-year time horizon, the mixes of tokens that is open versus closed?

Misha Laskin25:16

Well, I think you're kind of starting to see the trajectory now, which is that maybe six months ago, it was majority closed, minority open when you go to any gateway like OpenRouter or Vercel. And it's flipped almost exactly from 70-30 closed-open to 70-30 open-closed now.

I think that's only going to accelerate. And I suspect that the world is going to look not too dissimilar from

operating systems where 95% plus of servers, computers in the world run on an open source operating system like Linux. That doesn't mean that the closed stuff is very valuable. Microsoft and Apple, these are very extremely valuable companies. So the market for this stuff is really big.

So I think that we'll see most token demand going to open. A big difference here is that I think we'll also see a lot of economic value going to open simply because even if the model is

fully permissive or perhaps has a license on it, everything else you need to run it is still expensive. The compute is still expensive. So you're in a different world than

hardware accelerators like GPUs and others. It's a more expensive compute substrate than CPUs. And so you have a different kind of cloud that needs to be built around it. So I expect the majority of tokens to be going to open source, extremely valuable closed model companies to exist, a valuable ecosystem of open model companies and various distributors around them to exist as well.

Sarah Guo26:59

Do you have a sense of what proportion of the open tokens are RL versus not versus sort of base model?

Misha Laskin27:04

I think every single open model that's out there at this point has been RL to some extent.

Sarah Guo27:11

Oh, yeah. But I mean for a specific use case or application.

Misha Laskin27:14

Yeah.

Sarah Guo27:14

And then a custom model.

Misha Laskin27:15

Yeah. So I think.

Sarah Guo27:16

To today.

Misha Laskin27:17

What I've heard kind of statistics that some of the kind of open model dedicated inference providers say is that it's actually a vast majority, 90% plus customized. But there's a caveat there because today, the biggest customers of dedicated inference are AI natives and maybe digital natives who have a whole product that is just one big customization of an open model, like a cursor or Cognition, a Bridge Harvey, like these kinds of companies that have a product that's built around something that's big and customized.

So that would make sense then, well, if you're supporting those workloads, the majority of them would be fine-tuned. I actually have a different take of what's going to happen in enterprise. I think that the majority of enterprise token consumption is going to come not from customized models, but from customized systems, meaning you took an open model, you didn't actually fine-tune it yet.

You just customized a system around it, like your agentic harness around it to make it work for some KYC flow or something like that. And then once you're sophisticated enough, you might start fine-tuning and moving to that. But I actually think that in enterprise,

it will be kind of reversed in the sense that the journey that AI natives went through, which was start with a closed model, then move to an open model, then customize it, they went through it very quickly because they set up native products that are data collectors.

Enterprises are mostly architecting this around their existing products and existing tools. And I think that there are a lot of frictions there to just do a straight shot to fine-tuning. So in enterprise, I suspect it'll be a bit different.

Sarah Guo29:02

And do you think they'll still start with, say, the art models or the closed models, and then they'll move over, but the harness will be the mechanism by which they customize the open model?

Misha Laskin29:11

That has been our observation, that the point at which an enterprise is considering open models, and most of the enterprises we talk to are considering now, is by the time they've ramped up some significant workloads with closed models.

And I have not seen kind of a basically straight shot kind of sprint to an ownership market, that you have to go through the rental stage to become.

Sarah Guo29:37

And it has to be a big enough cost driver for your enterprise. And then you say, how do I cut costs? And this is valuable enough for me to keep it. And so then I switch over.

Misha Laskin29:44

Yeah. If you're spending, let's say, $100 million plus, which is not uncommon at all, on closed models a year, then you start thinking about, well,

maybe I should figure out a more optimal way to do this. And I think there's an interesting resurgence of on-prem in the sense of also because there's a compute shortage. And so it sometimes becomes if you're an enterprise and you're consuming from your favorite hyperscaler, very often there's just not enough compute.

It's hard to get good rates there.

But you're spending so much money. So you might go with an infrastructure provider like Dell and say, I just want to set up the bare metal, but I want to serve stuff into my enterprise. And then, well, what happens then?

Who helps them with that layer between the bare metal and actually making them successful?

Sarah Guo30:37

And you view that as your role in the open model world?

Misha Laskin30:40

Yes. Yeah. So I mean, we view our role as enabling enterprises to build successful solutions. So it is solutions-driven in the sense that the thing that enabled AI natives to adopt open models, well, it's building their own solution.

But enterprises just need more help there. And so it's really around going in, assessing what are the biggest value things you can do there. And a lot of these enterprises can go like they might have built an agent that spans hundreds of millions of customers on closed models that they really want to scale out.

And so the scaling factor is very high. It's very hard to go in and just say, we're going to give you inference. I've not heard that. That has not worked.

Competition31:31

Sarah Guo31:31

Yeah, yeah, yeah. The closed model ecosystem is a competitive one. It looks increasingly like the open model ecosystem will also be. I mean, tell me if you disagree with that claim as well.

Misha Laskin31:42

No, I agree. It's all very competitive.

Sarah Guo31:44

Yeah. I mean, large markets tend to be. What do you think are the important dimensions of competition when you think about yourselves and how you position in the long run?

Misha Laskin31:53

Yeah. Well, I have kind of a pretty simple formula for ultimately, the way anyone wins in this is by, well, it's how much revenue or how much durable revenue are you generating? And the formula is what intelligence density are you able to offer times how much compute do you have times how much trust do you have with organizations that they would want to work with you?

Basically, how good are you at solving their problems? And because something that's interesting about this market that maybe you all know more than I do, actually, previous markets in terms of what were limiting factors. But compute is scarce.

So there are a lot of things that previously were and maybe this is a temporary thing, but I don't see this as being a temporary thing for some time.

So in previous, I don't know, competitive instances, you might say, oh, there's like these few players are all undifferentiated. But then it turns out if you are really good and you have the compute, that it's OK. I mean, I see the whole space being competitive across the whole stack.

And

there are arguments around, well, this part is getting commoditized and that part is getting commoditized. In reality, everything is getting commoditized. Everything across the whole stack is so hyper-competitive that it's getting commoditized. And the model margins are going to be compressed.

There is an open model tension with closed models that, I think, does lead to a margin compression. The application stuff, margins compress the inference layer and the bare metal.

Sarah Guo33:29

We see a lot of the AI native companies negotiate their closed deals very aggressively because the open ecosystem exists. So it's explicitly true.

Misha Laskin33:39

So I think that for any one of these companies, and you can think about any even AI native company as what is the intelligence density that they serve to customers, how much compute do they have, and how much trust do they have with those customers because they're driving successful solutions for them, which means that if those are the three factors, then

so long as there are great open models, so so long as you have great intelligence density out there that is accessible, there should be many successful companies because then it's a matter of how much compute can each one assemble.

Now, we are actually in a world where when you are a great kind of intelligence builder and you're able to and this is kind of what's happened with the closed companies, that your revenue really shoots up and you're just able to amass more compute than anyone else.

And that puts you in a strategic position. But that is what I think is required to win. You have to serve great intelligence, have a lot of compute, and have trust with customers.

Chinese models34:38

Sarah Guo34:39

Yeah. How do you think about so if you look at the era that you mentioned at the very beginning of this conversation, two years ago, a lot of the open weights or open source models were Western in origin.

So Mistral was developed in Europe. Obviously, Meta was a mix of Europe and the US. And what's happened over the last year or two is we've really seen the rise of Chinese open weight models. In some cases, there's the perspective that they've been distilling a lot off of the state-of-the-art models.

And so that's part of what's allowed them to make very rapid progress. The labs are now trying to now roll out or the big sort of closed labs are trying to roll out tools to prevent as much distillation from happening or at least making it more challenging.

What do you think happens over the next year or two in terms of Chinese open source or Chinese open weight models? Do you think it remains where it's at? Do you think it evolves? What happens?

Misha Laskin35:26

So I think the first thing is that the fact that a great open model ecosystem came from China is actually a massive benefit for the world. There are so many companies in the West that have been able to build more durable businesses as a result of that.

So there is a sense in which it's a very positive thing and a gift because you could imagine a world where such a thing didn't happen and then there are just no open models. And there's a kind of a tall poppy syndrome that happens when if you're an application builder and you build something that's great, well, then it gets subsumed into a closed model provider because, well, it's a business that needs to generate revenue.

So I view it as positively. The thing that is the thing is that you don't want a world that is kind of

monopolar in any given way, that you either have all sort of resources and compute concentrating across closed labs or like a handful. Let's say if it was I think if it was like 10, 20 closed labs, then fine, you have a competitive ecosystem.

But if it's one or two, that's a bit scarier. And similarly, you don't want the source of intelligence that everyone else can build on when they want to own it to be coming from one country. Ideally, it'd be also 10 or 20, but the capital expenditures are very high.

So at least two would be great. And so I think it's extremely important that there's an

ecosystem that competes with China in the West. But it's not really a West versus China thing. It's more of a

if there was one country other than China where all the great open models are coming from, you'd probably also want some competitive tension. Competitive tension is just good. I think that the Chinese models will continue to be great.

There is an advantage that they have in they have a number of advantages and a number of disadvantages. But the advantages are they certainly distill closed models at industrial scale. That is true.

They have access to data that is much cheaper and free because you can just train on PDFs that are copyrighted in China. It's OK, just different regulation.

And I think that and there is a notion in which those companies do have some state support, whether directly or indirectly, for

these companies were not making any revenue for a long time.

Sarah Guo38:07

Yeah. I always thought that Chinese open source was basically a subsidy by the Chinese government to US enterprise or to Western enterprise in terms of if you actually looked at what was happening.

Misha Laskin38:16

Yeah, exactly. And I think that continues. I mean, now these businesses are these companies are turning into businesses. And while the models are open abroad, they are within China, they're kind of the equivalents of the closed model labs here.

So there are real businesses that are being built there. And I think that they'll continue building great models.

Sarah Guo38:40

Do you think they're going to keep them open here? In other words, why do that if you now have an economic driver and pattern? What do you think is the incentive for them to keep the models open in the West?

Misha Laskin38:49

In the West or in the?

Sarah Guo38:51

In the West.

Misha Laskin38:52

Yeah. It's a really interesting question. So fundamentally, there is a lot of demand from enterprise, public sector, sovereign for

Western open models for a number of reasons. But there are kind of regulatory fears or uncertainty, rather. And it is the case that it's not just you want not just a model, but a partner that will help you kind of serve that model.

So we have seen that there are most of Fortune 500, the open model footprint is actually pretty low today

because of sort of resistance or aversion to Chinese models for a number of reasons that are both some are rational and some are irrational. And so it's very clear that building those things is important. And so if you can sustain an economic engine that builds well, one, builds a lot of trust that the enterprise wants to work with you as the model builder.

And two, enables you to secure compute. Then if there's a commercial engine around this stuff, then.

Sarah Guo40:00

Yes. I totally agree that having a Western open weights model that provides incremental services and potentially inference or other things over time is really valuable. And I know that that's the direction you all are heading in. I'm just a little bit curious in terms of what is the incentive system for the Chinese.

Misha Laskin40:15

To allow.

Sarah Guo40:16

Model companies to continue to leave the models open.

Misha Laskin40:19

So the question is on the Chinese side.

Sarah Guo40:20

Correct.

Misha Laskin40:21

But yeah. So I think there it's actually that my hypothesis on that is that

China is somewhat of a captive market that you can build open models and still make a lot of money in that market. Something that's interesting is that in the West, there are plenty of I mean, there are great companies that don't build open models but serve them into various companies.

I'm not really aware of that dynamic happening in China as much. You'd think it would because that's the why not? So there's something interesting there where the open model providers are kind of the intelligence providers in that country.

And I think that the continuing to release great open models is very geopolitically advantageous to China for a number of reasons. But one is that you want as a country and this is for America and China and any other country that has the capabilities that you want other countries building on your stuff.

There have been previous escalations or tensions between the US and China in 5G fiber layout and the Belt and Road Initiative. Ultimately, when you go in and you provide something cheap to another country that then gets locked into your infrastructure, there are just commercial and geopolitical advantages for that.

Sarah Guo41:41

So you think it's almost like rare earth minerals or something. You have a component that other people will use for all sorts of purposes. And therefore, you have geopolitical leverage through that.

Misha Laskin41:49

Yes. So one way I kind of think about is that open models are Trojan horses for the infrastructure that they bring with them. So you have an open model, but that alone is not very useful. So you buy into the entire software ecosystem and infrastructure ecosystem of a given country.

So that would be OK, maybe today, allied country, US allied country X might run a Chinese model on American chips. But pretty soon, if not I mean, and we're seeing this already is that Chinese companies like Huawei are going to be coming in and offering a full stack solution and then locking into that country's supply.

So I think that if we kind of think about AI or chips and data centers almost as railroads or something like that, it's kind of fundamental infrastructure. And

everyone, but no other country can actually build their own railroads. They all have to go to you or another country. You have a lot of geopolitical leverage.

Sarah Guo42:49

I see. And so it could just be, for example, inferencing a specific model will occur in a more performant way on a specific chipset. And that chipset happens to be provided by Huawei or something.

Misha Laskin43:01

Yeah. So these stacks are in real time getting optimized end to end because in some sense, the paradigm has been set. This is that there are going to be other ways to scale intelligence possibly, but this is clearly the first one that really scaled.

So now everything's being optimized down the entire stack. And where China has a disadvantage today where their chips aren't as performant, they have an energy advantage. And they are I mean, they're very good. They're catching up on the chip side too.

Sarah Guo43:31

And that's going to only accelerate with the models in terms of model usage to design next-generation chips and things like that.

Misha Laskin43:37

Yeah, certainly. And then I think there is the thing in terms of it is, again, geopolitically competitive with the United States specifically. The notion of American companies and startups

building on foreign technology, this notion that the rest of the world builds on your stuff. And by the way, America has done this with all other meaningful technologies like internet, open protocols, open source. The world basically American currency is like the widely established global currency.

Free trade works because we have a navy that's everywhere. So that's been actually the American playbook for a long time. It's interesting that in this case, I think the United States has been on the back foot when it comes to open source, but.

Sarah Guo44:29

No longer.

Misha Laskin44:29

Yeah. Well, I think we have to be clear. The competitors in China are just really, really good. And so there's an ecosystem that is just starting to form now in the United States. But there is some catch up to be had.

Safety debate44:44

Sarah Guo44:44

The biggest criticism from the closed labs of open models tends to be safety and controllability. What's your philosophy on this? And is that a legitimate concern?

Misha Laskin45:00

No, it's definitely a legitimate concern. And I think that so I do think that the safety worldview that has been established has been established from one particular perspective with one particular point of view that has become almost kind of kind of dogmatic.

If we were looking at from first principles at AI before considering closed or open or what have you, this technology is getting built. And you kind of had the foresight to know that it's going to have these capabilities and so forth.

And you are thinking about safety. How would you actually design it from scratch? And there are I mean, one way, one analogy to take it to is, well, software. You can kind of think about AI as a more advanced version of software.

It has many similarities, actually. It's like it is a digital utility. And there were debates, by the way, around software being dangerous, particularly in the early 1990s around strong encryption protocols. They were actually closed at the time. And there were debates between the NSA and kind of civil liberty advocates around whether you should close it or open it.

And ultimately, the decision after some catastrophic failures on the closed side where effectively a small handful of engineers designed certain systems that had unintended consequences that they couldn't predict and got easily hacked effectively, that strong encryption protocols became open.

And that actually gave birth to the whole field of cybersecurity. So the way the world, the default state of the world is actually openness is safety. That's a default state that we'd be going into AI with if we were just thinking about continuation of technology.

And models actually have a lot of similarities but kind of exacerbated to software in that the long tail of vulnerabilities is larger. It's harder to understand than software because it's a black box. And the long tail of vulnerabilities and hence unintended consequences is larger.

And Linus's law, creator of Linux, is that with enough eyeballs, all bugs become shallow. And I have the belief that with enough eyeballs, most security and safety vulnerabilities become shallow as well. So the state of the world today is that we have a few hundred safety researchers within closed labs that understand how these things work.

And despite their best intentions, it is impossible to cover the long tail of vulnerabilities or unintended consequences that these systems might have, which is why the symptom of this is that when we actually look at what major cybersecurity issues have surfaced, well, it's that a very powerful closed model had unintended consequences where it went and hacked into another company.

And the only way that company could remediate itself was by using open models to protect itself. So that's the empirical evidence of the world that we're in.

Sarah Guo47:50

When you say safety, by the way, because I feel like people really conflate notions of safety. And safety means three or four different things to different people. There's safety in terms of cyber attacks or the use of AI for hacking or other things.

There's safety. And I think this tends to be overstated in the short run around bioweaponry or terrorism. And then there's sort of safety from the perspective of an existential threat to humanity. And again, I feel like people kind of talk about these things as if they're one thing.

And each one of these are sort of separable. So when you're talking about safety, are you addressing all three of those? Do you mainly mean and by the way, I don't necessarily agree that these are all true things that are going to happen in any realistic time frame.

It's more just I'm a little bit curious how you think about the span of things that benefit from openness and benefit from these approaches.

Misha Laskin48:35

Yeah. I think on the safety spectrum, there's basically a spectrum of reality to empirical reality to theoretical scenarios. And I will grant that AI, there are sci-fi bits to it where something that was totally a theoretical thing last year is like a reality, which is the cyber capabilities of these models, for example.

So it's not to discount the theoretical stuff. But we have to be clear that there's real empirical stuff that's happening and that we can predict with some confidence will be happening in the next six months. And then there is maximal theoretical stuff.

Sarah Guo49:14

Yeah, yeah. I mean, the prior versions of that, for example, would be the thought that the atmosphere would catch fire the first time we set off a nuclear weapon.

Misha Laskin49:21

Yes.

Sarah Guo49:21

Right. So there's that theoretical fear. It didn't happen. But there was a lot of churn amongst a small subset of researchers in the physics community around that as an example. So there's been a lot of these theoretical things that could happen.

I remember there's also when people talk about nanotech, they used to talk about gray goop and how you'd accidentally release a nanobot and then suddenly it would eat the entire world. This was something that was discussed in the '90s in labs as people were working on microfluidics.

Misha Laskin49:47

Yeah, exactly.

Sarah Guo49:47

Things like that.

Misha Laskin49:49

So the challenge with AI is that it's so top of mind and it's permeated into everyday culture. And it's so easy to humanize that

it's kind of I think it feels like there's from a perception perspective almost like a not even uniform distribution around what safety means, but it's actually peaked at the doomsday scenarios. Whereas the reality is that there's probably like the service will peak to address is like the reality.

And then there's a decay into the theoretical. But it doesn't help when leaders of companies say on the theoretical side, there's a 10% chance that we all die. That doesn't help.

Sarah Guo50:28

Yeah. That's not substantiated by any specific.

Misha Laskin50:30

Right. It's just kind of a.

Sarah Guo50:31

It's kind of a made-up number.

Misha Laskin50:33

It is. So I tend to have, again, as a scientist, distributional thinking, which has kind of peaked at the reality. And then, OK, like six months ahead, definitely worried about

misalignment, that these unintended consequences of these systems and them continue to get more powerful. But we have to take the perspective that these are engineered tools. I think that there is a certain class of

companies or researchers who claim that

things around consciousness or emotions and so forth, which is maybe true, but it's so hard to define what those things are in particular that it's unclear what it is. So I think that thinking about these as intelligent tools and having a, yeah, just like a reality sort of spectrum.

And so while I think that the theoretical doomsday stuff is good dinner conversation, the thing is, let's say alignment, that's a big part of safety. How do you align these systems to behave in intended ways? And the reality is that alignment so far, the science of alignment, has been deeply boring and unsatisfying from a perspective.

There's no magical alignment equation. It's like a whack-a-mole thing. If you remember the early models before ChatGPT, there were some models released that were pre-trained and toxic. And then there was this notion that, oh, these models are toxic.

Can't fix it because it can be toxic in so many ways. And then it turned out, no, with enough post-training data, you can just patch all those things. And it generalizes in a way that it actually becomes pretty hard to jailbreak.

And now you're kind of seeing the same thing, that the reality with these alignment issues that they're probably going to be very mundane and boring where you've

discovered a bunch of these vulnerabilities. You have data that patches them up. You have some algorithms or some and when you say algorithms for detecting them, it's typically asking a language model to detect this thing.

Sarah Guo52:45

Yeah, it's a classic.

Misha Laskin52:47

So there's the theoretical kind of alignment safety philosophical stuff. And then the mundane reality that you're just patching up all sorts of bugs. And then it becomes a, well, shouldn't there be 100,000 researchers and computer scientists looking at patching up these bugs?

Wouldn't that be safer?

Sarah Guo53:02

I feel like there's a sort of important philosophical distinction, which it sounds like you're on one side of, but I'll let you be explicit about it, which is just even if they are very intelligent tools and if you just say we can as an ecosystem manage the unintended consequences, we don't want individuals and businesses to have such powerful tools.

Misha Laskin53:23

That is kind of coming from a standpoint that we can have access to powerful tools, but other people can't because we're effectively better. We're better at managing these tools. And well, it's kind of.

Sarah Guo53:37

To be fair to the claim, I think this is not my belief. But to be fair to the claim, it would be like the negative impact that any single person or company could have is too large. And that's scary.

But we can have them.

Misha Laskin53:48

Yeah.

Sarah Guo53:49

Yeah.

Misha Laskin53:49

Well, I mean, it's also like on a scale of weapons,right?

We have the US government sells jets into other countries,right? But I think that more broadly, it's not so easy to take a model, especially a model that's been even an open model that's been trained to be safe and

put in the compute and work and effort to

make it very dangerous. Now, I'm not saying it's impossible, but it's just like, again, when we think about cybersecurity, very intelligent hackers can go take and wreak havoc as they have. But you have an ecosystem where the defenses tend to outweigh the offenses.

And again, if we come to that as a default, that that's the way people secure software and that there are positive and bad actors on the internet. And ultimately, the internet is an ecosystem where it's kind of like having an ecosystem of white blood cells.

And enabling more people to have the defensive capabilities actually helps you protect against the offensive capabilities. When we look at, again, the empirical reality of what happened is that it's really hard to separate cyber defense from offense. So when you remove cyber offensive capabilities, you also remove cyber defensive capabilities.

And as a result, the players who would want to help defending are incapable of doing so.

Sarah Guo55:27

And we saw that in some of the recent things that happened with the OpenAI hugging face incident where they reverted to using open source because they weren't able to use the existing state of the art labs because of the guardrails that were placed on the models.

Misha Laskin55:41

Yeah. I think that these arguments go into a place where they're very absolute, where you kind of say these things are so powerful that no one ever should have access to them except for us. And the reality is that that's never

it's hard except for some really rare exceptions where there are actually not that many positives,

where such absolutist perspectives worked.

Sarah Guo56:13

What are you most excited about if you think ahead two to five years in the AI world? It's very hard to predictright now. But as you think ahead in terms of the curve of technology, the curve of adoption, what do you think is some of the positive things that you view as coming?

Misha Laskin56:28

There's so many positive things that are coming. And they have been coming. And an example is that

I'm personally very excited about scientific progress. That's got into science as we move to the states, developed interest in physics, and always kind of had this lifelong pursuit of science since then. And one of the prompts that I was trying with language models over the last few years is giving it my PhD thesis, which granted a lot of getting to the point where you have theright question of the PhD thesis is kind of that that's a lot of the work.

But then actually executing the rote work takes a really long time as well. And overall, between finding theright question and executing the answer, write a PhD, I think took a few years. And so I was asking language models over the last couple of years, giving them this prompt of my thesis.

Science & progress57:16

Misha Laskin57:25

A couple of years ago, well, it was just chat, so it couldn't do anything. Then a year ago, it started answering things I would say at an undergraduate level. That would have been my answer if this was given to me as a homework in undergraduate.

Six months ago, it solved it

at real PhD level and

solved it correctly. And now when I actually try it, it actually even gives me some interesting new information that I hadn't considered at the time. And so we've gone so now you can if you have theright question, you can just put it into a chat box and have it do all the calculation and give you something really interesting.

Sarah Guo58:05

That's so exciting.

Misha Laskin58:06

Right. Which means that your iteration speed, why do you need a few years? What's the point of a few-year PhD? You can do a PhD a week,right?

Sarah Guo58:14

Yeah. It's similar to the recent news from OpenAI. I think it was the last day or two in terms of all the various mathematical theorems that were proved in the last couple weeks by OpenAI. So yeah, it's kind of crazy what's been happening.

Misha Laskin58:30

No, it's absolutely incredible what this is going to do for science. I think that the other stuff I'm really excited about is

not just theoretical science, where the environment is basically a well, would be the equivalent of a chalkboard or something. But real-world science, life sciences, material science, chemistry, I think there are a lot of places where you can have an AI interfacing with a real experiment where you can set up proprietary data flywheels.

And it's going to be a bit slower, well, much slower than the chalkboard stuff, but dramatically faster than what it was before. So

I think we kind of underestimate, continue to underestimate how dramatic of a shift this has been for software engineering and how much more you can build.

I think it's an already very incredible and positive tool in many ways. Also at the blue-collar level as well, I had the

I toured Stargate some weeks back. And the thing that struck me was the amount of cars in the parking lots. There are so many people working there. So these data center projects create tens of thousands of jobs that are high-paying jobs.

To me, it kind of seems like data center now is kind of what a factory used to be. You have these railroads and factories in the 20th century. You had maybe like a shoe factory that makes a town produce kind of a vibrant economy within a town.

And that is, at least when I'm on the ground seeing the stuff that's getting built, there is fear of data centers. But then the reality is you go on the ground and it actually creates a lot of jobs, a lot of tax revenue for local communities.

And while there are certain things that I think need to be done very tactfully, like these things are noisy, so you need to kind of insulate the noise or put them in places that are less close to residential.

But it is certainly the case that for local economies, these things do create jobs. They generate tax revenues and just feel like what a factory used to be in terms of job creation.

Research direction1:01:02

Sarah Guo1:01:02

How do you direct the scientific and experimental effort now from Beam going forward? And within that, assuming that you are trying to use the models themselves to improve your training effort, what is the role of the science team today?

Misha Laskin1:01:21

The way we direct our research, and a lot of this falls under my co-founder Yannis, who leads the research in technology, among other things,

it's really there are a lot of things that we know work that we weren't able to put in. It's just a timeline thing.

So we trained the final model on the SpaceX cluster that we received in July. And so it was a few weeks of pre-training, then a few weeks of synthetic data on RL, then shipping it. And so there's a lot of stuff that didn't make it in that we're really excited about.

And so there's a trade-off of the careful execution of kind of known things or bets that have a bit less risk around them and then the going on to kind of more risky bets. And so you kind of want to exhaust all the high-impact things that you know work and then start expanding some of the risk profile.

And the way you do this is that on the risk profile, you have scaling experiments where you do stuff at small scale. I think the interesting bit is that some interesting things don't emerge at all until you're at large scale.

So there's a bit of an art and science of, am I going to put in more compute to find out the next thing or go on to the next idea?

As far as model in the loop goes, I find it to be very empowering for researchers because, again, things that would have taken a long time individually now can be just done fairly quickly. So these models are fairly jagged in their intelligence.

So you have to kind of feel where they have kind of a tight loop and where

human creativity is still important. But you get a feel for it pretty quickly. And so the place where you can loop things, you do that. And there are all sorts of things around hyperparameter searches and some of the more granular things on infrastructure that these things can be helpful in.

But I actually think they're very exciting tools because they enable a scientist to exercise their intuition. It's kind of like having a very fast and eager colleague that actually listens to you, if the colleague is aligned correctly. And so I see researchers just getting a lot more ability to move a lot faster than they had before, which is why maybe the rate of improvement

annual was roughly, let's say, 7X before when it was just manual work. And now several times that, say, maybe 4 to 5X. And so it's actually really exciting for a researcher to have these tools. There is this question around, at what point do you not need a researcher in the loop?

Sarah Guo1:04:33

I was going to ask you, if you need 100 people today, do you need 20 next year for the same effort?

Misha Laskin1:04:40

For the same effort, yes. But I think

you're constantly expanding the ambition of what you can do. And so we find ourselves

constantly understaffed rather than over. But there is actually I mean, there's basically a staff to compute ratio that you need to keep in mind. So it's not like it just goes on forever. I think 3,000 researchers would not be very helpful, but a couple of hundred very, very helpful.

Sarah Guo1:05:11

Yeah. The argument I've heard is that given the amount of compute you need to allocate per person, and especially to your point, if you want to scale certain experiments up over time, and then couple to that, often there's a bit of a distribution in terms of contributions.

In other words, there's a handful of people who contribute the most from an idea perspective in every field, physics, biology, whatever, eventually it collapses into you want to give every incremental piece of compute to the most productive subset of people.

And so therefore, you end up with some static or shrinking number of researchers over time. That'd be kind of the argument in the extreme in terms of where you end up. I'm not saying it's correct. I'm just saying that's kind of an argument I've heard being made.

Misha Laskin1:05:48

The argument definitely has merit. So these projects, actually, they never needed a crazy amount of researchers to really when you think about projects like AlphaGo, at the time, it was maybe order of 10 people. And now I think that maybe for large efforts like the one we're doing, maybe an order of 100 or hundreds.

So it's never been the case that you needed an extraordinary number of people. And the question whether it collapses back into 10 or not, it's hard to say. I would estimate that there's going to be some steady state in that kind of order of 100.

There are just a lot of things to do. But there will be a lot of job creation in applied research. Going and taking these things and actually applying them to real problems, I think there's going to be.

Sarah Guo1:06:42

I think people really lose that when they talk about engineering and research in terms of the diffusion of those roles out into a broader swath of society and not just building language models. And so to your point, there's lots of other model types to build.

There's lots of closed-loop systems to build. But even when people talk about engineers and the potential displacement of engineers, and so far the evidence seems that many companies need more engineers versus fewer, there's also the diffusion of certain level quality of engineer out to actually deploy the technology in organizations that never would have been able to access somebody of that sort of talent level on a relative basis, or at least not at scale.

And so I do think that's kind of lost as people think about the economy. They tend to centralize it into a handful of big tech companies instead of saying, what is the overall GDP and how does that get transformed by the diffusion of people bringing this technology out?

Misha Laskin1:07:27

I think that's correct. So again, the amount of researchers you do these things, it's not like it's changed dramatically over the years. It's always been big project, OK, around 100 people. I don't think you need the thousands on a big project.

But maybe on different product surfaces, OK, then you need a bunch of people. And what's interesting is that when you look at the distribution of why do you even need hundreds of people? And a lot of it is also you have teams that do evals for different things and collect data for different things.

When you're generating, it's not by accident these models have capabilities. There are pods of 5 to 10 people that go and target a particular capability. And within coding, there are 5 to 10 capabilities. So

that's for bringing the general capabilities to the model. But now when you want to take that model and apply it to real-world capabilities, you basically need a pod for any real-world capability. And each enterprise has many, many of them.

So I think that the job creation for this new type of forward-deployed engineer that is a bit more scientific and evaluations-oriented and has some intuition for these models and the harnesses, which is actually what the evaluation researcher does.

So it's actually the same skill set as the researcher building the core thing, which is deployed to work on real problems. And that is, we'll take as many of those people as possible. It's more of a training gap on that.

That is like you need to train engineers to become good at this than it is we would take as many as possible today.

Sarah Guo1:09:11

Congratulations, Misha, having the first Western model that is in the class of the frontier. It's just been a big step forward for the ecosystem.

Misha Laskin1:09:22

Thank you. Thank you so much.

Sarah Guo1:09:23

Yeah. Thanks for joining us.

Misha Laskin1:09:24

Yeah.

Sarah Guo1:09:27

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